I confess to one fault. I should have arrested and transported
him to Khartoum when he first arrived at Gondokoro with the cattle
stolen from the Shir; which caused the subsequent massacre of the five
soldiers of the government.
At the same time that I admit this error, it must be remembered that I
was placed in an awkward position.
"Absolute and supreme power" is a high-sounding title; but how was I to
exert it?
I was an individual possessing a nominal power, the application of which
required extreme delicacy. I was determined to win, and with God's help
I did win, but every step necessitated the coolest judgment. Had I
adopted severe or extreme measures against Abou Saood, I might have
ruined the expedition at commencement.
It was impossible to know who was faithful. There was a general leaning
towards his favour among all the officers, with whom he had been in
close connection when in Khartoum. He was a man in a high social
position in the Soudan, the partner of the great firm of Agad & Co., who
commanded about 2,500 armed men. He had worked for many years in company
with the government, according to his connection by agreement with the
governor-general.
I knew that I had him in my power, provided I should be supported by the
authorities in Egypt; therefore I gave him line, and occasionally held
him tight, as though he had been a salmon on a single gut; but I was
determined to land him safe at last, in such a manner that his greatest
supporter should be obliged to acknowledge that he had received the
fairest play. Abou Saood's Fatiko station was crowded with slaves. His
people were all paid in slaves. The stations of Fabbo, Faloro, and
Farragenia were a mass of slaves.
I did not enter a station to interfere with these wretched captives, as
I knew that such an act would create irretrievable confusion.
I had only 212 men, and I wished to advance to the equator.
Fatiko was in north latitude 3 degrees 01 minutes, and 165 miles from
headquarters. Had I attempted to release some thousand slaves from the
different stations, I should have required a large military force to
have occupied those stations, and to have driven out the whole of the
slave-hunters bodily.
If the slaves had been released, it would have been impossible to have
returned them to their homes, as they had been collected from every
quarter of the compass and from great distances. If I had kept them, I
could not have procured food for so large a number: as the stations
contained several thousand.
Under the circumstances, I took the wiser course of non-interference
with the stock in hand, but I issued the most severe orders respecting
the future conduct of Abou Saood's companies.
