By stealing
slaves and cattle from the interior, and delivering them here,
have utterly destroyed all hope of improvement in a people
naturally savage, but now rendered by your acts thieves of the
worst description.
"It is impossible that I can permit the continuance of such acts.
"I therefore give you due notice that at the expiration of
your contract you will withdraw all your people from the district
under my command. At the same time I declare the forfeiture
to the government of the cattle you have forcibly captured under
the eyes of my authority.
"SAMUEL W. BAKER."
The only error that I can acknowledge throughout the expedition was my
present leniency. I should at once have placed Abou Saood in irons, and
have sent him to Khartoum, instead of leaving him at large to carry on
his intrigues against the government.
I intended on the first opportunity to send notice to the Shir tribe of
the safety of their cattle, but an incident shortly occurred that
altered my determination. (These cattle were kept in a separate pen or
zareeba, and were guarded when at pasturage by special soldiers for some
weeks, in order that they should be returned to the Shir tribe upon the
first opportunity.)
At the same time that Abou Saood was in disgrace, he was a bosom friend
of the colonel, Raouf Bey, who commanded my troops. They dined together
constantly in the house of the latter officer, and their friendship had
originally commenced in Khartoum during the long interval that the
regiments were awaiting my arrival from Cairo. It was during that
interval that the officers of the expedition had fraternized with the
White Nile traders who resided at Khartoum.
The result of such intimacy might be imagined.
The object of the expedition had always been distasteful to both
officers and men. The traders had already seen by the, examples made at
Tewfikeeyah that I should actually destroy their cherished slave-trade.
It was therefore natural that Abou Saood should exert himself to ruin
the expedition. Having friend in Raouf Bey, he was in a position to
create division of opinion. He constantly associated with this officer,
in order that it should be generally known that he was supported by an
influential person in the government service. The scandal of the camp
quickly assumed that the opinions concerning the slave-traders between
myself and Raouf Bey were at variance.
The officers of the expedition had, contrary to my express orders,
purchased 126 slaves from the stations of the traders during the White
Nile voyage! I had only learnt this on arrival at Gondokoro; thus when
corn was so scarce that the rations were reduced, while those of meat
were increased, we had an addition of 126 mouths!
The policy of the slave-traders was identical with the feelings of the
officers and men, all of whom wished to abandon the expedition and
return to Khartoum. Abou Saood worked molelike in his intrigues. He
fraternized secretly with Allorron and his Baris. Many of his men
purchased tobacco from the natives in exchange for ammunition. The
natives from Belinian were in daily communication with Abou Saood's
camp, and their spies obtained information of our proceedings, and
carried the news throughout the country that "they would be supported by
Abou Saood against my authority."
I learnt everything that occurred through trustworthy agents. It quickly
became known that Raouf Bey was desirous to terminate the expedition.
The contagion spread rapidly, and the men worked languidly and without
the slightest interest: they had made up their minds that the expedition
was a failure, and that a scarcity of corn would be their excuse for a
return to Khartoum. Abou Saood fanned the flame among the officers, and
discontent became general.
In the mean time the Baris were very active in annoying the camp at
night. Although these natives could not stand against the troops in the
open, they harassed them by necessitating a perpetual vigilance both by
night and day. It was necessary to have strong patrols in two parties at
all hours; and I regret to say the Egyptian officers and men did not
appear to enjoy a state of war where activity and good discipline were
absolutely necessary. The Soudani officers and men, although ignorant,
were far superior to the Egyptians in activity and courage.
Unfortunately the camp was sickly. The men now suffered from the fatigue
of the long voyage through slush and marsh. Many had fever and
dysentery. Ulcerated legs were prevalent; and this disease appeared to
be contagious. Many men died from these malignant ulcers, which in some
cases entirely destroyed the foot. The women did not suffer from this
complaint. It originated from a poisonous grass that festered the wound
it gave, and rapidly produced an incurable sore. As the women had not
been exposed to the work in the marshes, they had escaped the scourge
inflicted by the sharp edges of the grass.
There was no rest for the people; they had to build their camp and fight
the Baris at the same time. A scarcity of corn stared them in the face.
The officers and men were well aware that we could not hope for regular
supplies of corn and reinforcements of troops from Khartoum in the
dreadful state of the river: thus they felt their position keenly, as
sick, dispirited, in the midst of enemies, with approaching famine of
corn, and no communication with the Soudan. All these difficulties were
to be endured for the sake of an object which they detested - "the
suppression of the slave trade."
CHAPTER IX.
NEW ENEMIES
Our enemies were not confined to the land only: the crocodiles in the
neighbourhood of Gondokoro were exceedingly ferocious.
