Thus, in the dark, he had
frequently wandered from the track. In the daytime he had slept in the
concealment of forests.
He had run this risk in order to be the first to give me the bad news,
lest I should suspect him of foul play. All my soldiers were killed,
except the major, Achmet Rafik, and a corporal!
When Abou Saood had passed his country some weeks since, his people had
attacked a neighbouring sheik, and had carried off a large number of
cattle, although he was aware of the presence of a government officer
with a very small detachment. Abou Saood had sent three of the captured
cows as a present to the officer in command, Achmet Rafik, who, instead
of protesting against the razzia, had, Turk-like, actually accepted the
present, and thus had fallen into the snare.
The natives, smarting under the unprovoked attack, visited Niambore, and
desired him to send my men out of the country, as they were evidently
leagued with those of Abou Saood. The sheik Niambore refused, and
declared that he should protect them until he received further orders
from me. This implicated Niambore, and the neighbours then insisted upon
the sacrifice of Achmet Rafik and his few soldiers in revenge for their
lost cattle. Niambore, with a chivalry that is rare among negroes,
declared his determination of sheltering my people until he should
communicate with me. He was attacked at night by the neighbouring
sheiks; and my soldiers assisted him in the defence. The attack was
repulsed, and he determined to return the compliment on the following
day, with the assistance of the soldiers. After a long march across many
deep channels, the battle went against him, and in a precipitate
retreat, the soldiers could not swim the deep channels like Niambore's
people; they were accordingly overtaken and killed, with the loss of
their arms and accoutrements, now in possession of the natives.
Major Achmet Rafik and a corporal were safe, as they were both ill, and
had therefore not accompanied the five soldiers in the attack. Niambore
had faithfully exposed himself to great danger in order to secure their
protection, and they were now in his keeping, concealed in a forest
about a day's march from the village which had been their station.
On the following day I sent the steamer off at 9 p.m. with Niambore and
twenty men, the moon being full. The river had risen about four feet six
inches, therefore there was no fear of her touching a sand-bank. At the
same time I wrote to Abou Saood, giving him notice of his responsibility
for the loss of the government troops, caused by his unprovoked and
unjustifiable aggression. (From that time, I of course gave up all
ideas of returning the cattle that had been captured by Abou Saood, as I
had originally intended. Such an act, after the destruction of my men,
would have been received by the Shir as a proof of fear.)
All my anticipations of successful cultivation had been fruitless. The
drought of this year had caused a general scarcity. The months of July
and August should have the heaviest rainfall; July had just expired with
a rainfall of only 1.13 inch. The mean temperature had been 71 degrees F
at 6 a.m.; at noon, 84 degrees F.
I was very anxious about our supply of dhurra, which would not last much
longer. On 1st August I ordered the troops to receive fifteen days'
rations of rice, so as to save the small stock of dhurra until the crops
should be ripe upon the island. These were guarded by a company of
troops. I extract the following entry from my journal:-
"August 2, 1871. - The Soudani soldiers are discontented with their
rations of dhurra; and to-day I was addressed by an unreasonable mob,
demanding an increase of corn which does not exist. These people never
think of to-morrow, and during the long voyage from Tewfikeeyah they
have been stealing the corn, and drinking merissa heedless of the
future.
"The black colonel, Tayib Agha, is much to blame for the discontent, as
he has, upon several occasions, in THE PRESENCE OF THE TROOPS, told Mr.
Higginbotham and myself that 'the men could not work well because they
were hungry.' This foolish remark, made before the soldiers by their own
lieutenant-colonel, is certain to create bad feeling.
"I went across to the island to examine the corn: the greater portion of
the crop will be ready in about eight days, but the Baris, in spite of
the guards, are stealing large quantities during the night.
"The terrible difficulty in this country is the want of corn; and now
that all direct communication with Khartoum is cut off by the
obstructions in the Nile, the affair is most serious. The natives are
all hostile, thus a powerful force is absolutely necessary, but the
difficulty is to feed this force.
"I wrote an official letter to Raouf Bey to caution Lieutenant-Colonel
Tayib Agha against making remarks in the presence of his troops."
On August 3 the steamer returned, bringing Achmet Rafik and the sole
surviving soldier from the Shir. This officer declared his men to have
been insubordinate, and that they joined the natives against his orders
to make an attack upon their enemies in return for attacks on their
part.
Two witnesses, the surviving soldier and the wife of one that was
killed, declared that Achmet Rafik himself gave the men orders to fight
the tribe, in company with the people of Niambore; but fearing
responsibility for the result, he now laid the onus of failure upon the
insubordination of the men. (The fact remained that in consequence of
the razzia made by Abou Saood's orders the natives attacked Niambore and
my people.
