The men's wives were decked out with gaudy colours, and were happy in
proportion to the amount of red and yellow.
The troops and sailors were astonished at the unfailing contents of the
magazines, which established confidence that should we be positively cut
off from all communication with Khartoum, we were nevertheless
independent of supplies.
Everything was in order at Gondokoro. The natives were at peace; food
was abundant; the station securely fortified.
I now determined to penetrate into the south, and to carry a steamer in
sections to N. lat. 3 degrees 32 minutes, where she would be constructed
by the Englishmen, and launched on the navigable river above the last
cataracts, to open the communication with the Albert N'yanza.
All intrigues and opposition to the expedition had been overcome.
Although my force was small, the men were full of confidence, and
promised to follow wheresoever I might lead.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE ADVANCE SOUTH.
Military critics will condemn my arrangements for an advance south.
My original plans had been well laid. A line of fortified posts was to
have been established throughout the country at intervals of three days'
march. This would have assured an open communication with Gondokoro.
Unfortunately, my force had been 350 men short of the number stipulated;
and the 1,200 men that had once been reviewed at Gondokoro had been
reduced to 500.
I could not leave a smaller force at head-quarters than 340 men,
including the 52 sailors; thus I was left with only 212 officers and men
to commence a long and uncertain journey directly away from my base,
without the power of communication in the event of unforeseen
difficulty.
I had already experienced the treachery of natives, upon whom no
reliance could be placed.
My intention was to leave the Englishmen, with the steamer sections, at
a station to be formed at Ibrahimeyeh (Afuddo on the map) on the
navigable Nile, N. lat. 3 degrees 32 minutes, together with a small
garrison.
I should then endeavour to form an irregular corps of some of Abou
Saood's men, who would be thrown out of employment at the expiration of
the contract. This was near at hand.
An irregular corps of 600 men would, in addition to my 200, enable me to
complete the annexation of the country, and to finish my work before the
reinforcements should arrive from Khartoum.
On the other hand, the men of Abou Saood might refuse to enlist in
government service. Already they had been rendered passively hostile by
the influence of Abou Saood. They had secretly encouraged the Baris in
their war against the government; they might repeat this conduct, and
incite the tribes against us in the interior.
Should this occur, I should be placed in a dangerous position with so
small a force, as it would be necessary to detach half the little body
to march to Gondokoro for supports.
I could not defer my departure in the hope of receiving reinforcements
from Khartoum, as their arrival would be quite uncertain, owing to the
state of the river.
Should I delay at Gondokoro, the dry season would pass by; the ground,
now baked hard by the sun, would become soft, and would render transport
by carts impossible.
The torrents would become impassable during the rains, especially the
river Asua, which in the wet season cuts off all communication with the
south. This dangerous river was very important, as it would prevent a
retreat should such a movement be necessary during the rainy season.
I was well aware of the difficulties of the position, but I had only the
choice of two evils. If I remained at Gondokoro, my term of service
would expire fruitlessly. I should simply have reduced the Baris, and
have established the station. Abou Saood would remain in the interior
among his numerous slave establishments, to ridicule my impotence, and
to defy my orders that he should quit the country. He would thus
continue in the heart of Africa until I should have returned helplessly
to England. He would then have resumed his original work of spoliation.
The expedition would have been a failure.
On the other hand, should my small force meet with defeat or
destruction, both the military and the civil world would exclaim, "Serve
him right! the expedition to the interior made under such circumstances
showed a great want of judgment; a total ignorance of the first rules in
military tactics. What could he expect, without an established
communication, at a distance of three or four hundred miles from his
base? Simple madness ! - not fit to command!" &c. &c. &c.
I knew the risks and the responsibility; but if I remained passive, I
should be beaten. I had often got through difficulties, and if risks are
to be measured in Africa by ordinary calculations, there would be little
hope of progress.
I determined to carry as large a supply of ammunition as could be
transported, together with sufficient merchandise, carefully assorted,
to establish a legitimate ivory trade in my old friend Kamrasi's
country, Unyoro (The Unyoro country is called by the traders
"Magungo.")
The Englishmen would be occupied in the construction of the steamer at
Ibrahimeyeh, while I should accomplish my mission farther south.
I selected my officers and men, carefully avoiding Egyptian officers,
with the exception of my true friends and aides-de-camp,
Lieutenant-Colonel Abd-el-Kader, Captain Mohammed Deii of the "Forty
Thieves," and the faithful Monsoor.
The Soudani officers that had served in Mexico under Marshal Bazaine
were - Major Abdullah; Captain Morgian Sherriff; Captain Abdullah;
Lieutenants Morgian and Ferritch; and several sergeants, corporals, &c.
I also included three sailors belonging to my diahbeeah, as they would
be useful in the event of boating excursions.
