Thus, When The Flood Came, It Was Not Merely That The Railway
Was Cut Through Here And There By The Rushing Deluge.
It was covered deep
in water, the ballast was swept away, and some of the banks so destroyed
that in places rails and sleepers were left hanging in the air
across a wide gap.'
Nearly fourteen miles of track were destroyed. The camp of the construction
gangs was wrecked and flooded. Some of the rifles of the escort - for the
conditions of war were never absent - were afterwards recovered from a depth
of three feet of sand. In one place, where the embankment had partly
withstood the deluge, a great lake several miles square appeared.
By extraordinary exertions the damage was repaired in a week.
As soon as the line as far as Kosheh was completed, the advance
towards Dongola began. After the army had been victorious at Hafir
the whole province was cleared of Dervishes, and the Egyptian forces
pushed on to Merawi. Here they were dependent on river transport.
But the Nile was falling rapidly, and the army were soon in danger of
being stranded by the interruption of river traffic between the Third
Cataract and Kenna. The extension of the line from Kosheh to Kerma was
therefore of vital importance. The survey was at once undertaken,
and a suitable route was chosen through the newly acquired and unmapped
territory. Of the ninety-five miles of extended track, fifty-six were
through the desert, and the constructors here gained the experience which
was afterwards of value on the great Desert Railway from Wady Halfa to
the Atbara. Battalions of troops were distributed along the line and
ordered to begin to make the embankments. Track-laying commenced south
of Kosheh on the 9th of October, and the whole work was carried forward
with feverish energy. As it progressed, and before it was completed,
the reach of the river from the Third Cataract to Kenna ceased to be
navigable. The army were now dependent for their existence on the
partly finished railway, from the head of which supplies were conveyed
by an elaborate system of camel transport. Every week the line grew,
Railhead moved forward, and the strain upon the pack animals diminished.
But the problem of feeding the field army without interfering with the
railway construction was one of extraordinary intricacy and difficulty.
The carrying capacity of the line was strictly limited. The worn-out
engines frequently broke down. On many occasions only three were in
working order, and the other five undergoing 'heavy repairs' which might
secure them another short span of usefulness. Three times the construction
had to be suspended to allow the army to be revictualled. Every difficulty
was, however, overcome. By the beginning of May the line to Kenna was
finished, and the whole of the Railway Battalion, its subalterns and its
director, turned their attention to a greater enterprise.
In the first week in December the Sirdar returned from England with
instructions or permission to continue the advance towards Khartoum,
and the momentous question of the route to be followed arose. It may at
first seem that the plain course was to continue to work along the Nile,
connecting its navigable reaches by sections of railway. But from Merawi
to Abu Hamed the river is broken by continual cataracts, and the broken
ground of both banks made a railway nearly an impossibility. The movements
of the French expeditions towards the Upper Nile counselled speed.
The poverty of Egypt compelled economy. The Nile route, though sure,
would be slow and very expensive. A short cut must be found. Three daring
and ambitious schemes presented themselves: (1) the line followed by the
Desert Column in 1884 from Korti to Metemma; (2) the celebrated, if not
notorious, route from Suakin to Berber; (3) across the Nubian desert
from Korosko or Wady Halfa to Abu Hamed.
The question involved the whole strategy of the war. No more important
decision was ever taken by Sir Herbert Kitchener, whether in office or in
action. The request for a British division, the attack On Mahmud's zeriba,
the great left wheel towards Omdurman during that battle, the treatment
of the Marchand expedition, were matters of lesser resolve than the
selection of the line of advance. The known strength of the Khalifa made
it evident that a powerful force would be required for the destruction
of his army and the capture of his capital. The use of railway transport
to some point on the Nile whence there was a clear waterway was therefore
imperative. Berber and Metemma were known, and Abu Hamed was believed,
to fulfil this condition. But both Berber and Metemma were important
strategic points. It was improbable that the Dervishes would abandon
these keys to Khartoum and the Soudan without severe resistance.
It seemed likely, indeed, that the Khalifa would strongly reinforce both
towns, and desperately contest their possession. The deserts between
Korti and Metemma, and between Suakin and Berber, contained scattered
wells, and small raiding parties might have cut the railway and perhaps
have starved the army at its head. It was therefore too dangerous to
project the railway towards either Berber or Metemma until they were
actually in our hands. The argument is circular. The towns could not be
taken without a strong force; so strong a force could not advance until
the railway was made; and the railway could not be made till
the towns were taken.
Both the Korti-Metemma and the Suakin-Berber routes were therefore
rejected. The resolution to exclude the latter was further strengthened
by the fact that the labour of building a railway over the hills behind
Suakin would have been very great.
The route via Abu Hamed was selected by the exclusion of the alternatives.
But it had distinct and apparent advantages. Abu Hamed was within striking
distance of the army at Merawi. It was not a point essential to the
Dervish defences, and not, therefore, likely to be so strongly garrisoned
as Berber or Metemma.
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