Iowa Must Pay As Much As Rhode Island;
Indiana Must Pay As Much As Massachusetts.
But Rhode Island and
Massachusetts could pay, without the sacrifice of any comfort to its
people, without any sensible suffering, an amount of direct taxation
which would crush the States of Iowa and Indiana - which indeed no
tax gatherer could collect out of those States.
Rhode Island and
Massachusetts could with their ready money buy Iowa and Indiana; and
yet the income tax to be collected from the poor States is to be the
same in amount as that collected from the rich States. Within each
individual State the total amount of income tax or of other direct
taxation to be levied from that State may be apportioned as the
State may think fit; but an income tax of two per cent. on Rhode
Island would probably produce more than an income tax of ten per
cent. in Iowa; whereas Rhode Island could pay an income tax of ten
per cent. easier than could Iowa one of two per cent.
It would in fact appear that the Constitution as at present framed
is fatal to all direct taxation. Any law for the collection of
direct taxation levied under the Constitution would produce
internecine quarrel between the Western States and those which
border on the Atlantic. The Western States would not submit to the
taxation. The difficulty which one here feels is that which always
attends an attempt at finality in political arrangements. One would
be inclined to say at once that the law should be altered, and that
as the money required is for the purposes of the Union and for State
purposes, such a change should be made as would enable Congress to
levy an income tax on the general income of the nation. But
Congress cannot go beyond the Constitution.
It is true that the Constitution is not final, and that it contains
an express article ordaining the manner in which it may be amended.
And perhaps I may as well explain here the manner in which this can
be done, although by doing so I am departing from the order in which
the Constitution is written. It is not final, and amendments have
been made to it. But the making of such amendments is an operation
so ponderous and troublesome that the difficulty attached to any
such change envelops the Constitution with many of the troubles of
finality. With us there is nothing beyond an act of Parliament. An
act of Parliament with us cannot be unconstitutional. But no such
power has been confided to Congress, or to Congress and the
President together. No amendment of the Constitution can be made
without the sanction of the State legislatures. Congress may
propose any amendments, as to the expediency of which two-thirds of
both Houses shall be agreed; but before such amendments can be
accepted they must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the States, or by conventions in three-fourths of the States, "as
the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
Congress." Or Congress, instead of proposing the amendments, may,
on an application from the legislatures of two-thirds of the
different States, call a convention for the proposing of them.
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