There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops
beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general
discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of
Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to
assist by the Pacha in command. Sometimes such revolts are factitious,
for political purposes. In all cases the position of Russia in Asia
Minor is one of extreme danger to Turkey, and it is far from improbable
that activity on her side, and passiveness upon ours, may terminate in a
friendship between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of
British interests, and to the confusion of the assumed Protectorate.
This document distinctly states:--If "Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of
them shall be retained by Russia, and if any further attempt shall be
made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further
territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the
definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty
the Sultan in defending them by force of arms."
In a despatch from Lord Salisbury to Sir A. H. Layard, dated 30th May,
1878, these ominous words are contained:--
"Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan
and Kars will not become the base from which
emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due
time followed by invading armies, the mere retention
of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence
in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte."
In the same lengthy despatch the conditions are described which Turkey
must fulfil in reforming the abuses of the present administration, &c.
&c., and there can be no doubt that the British government contemplated
the necessity of supplanting a considerable number of the peculant
Turkish officials by experienced English officers, whose supervision
would ensure the necessary reforms. If such a course should have been
accepted by the Porte there could be no question of the salutary effect,
as the presence of British officials in actual authority throughout the
provinces of Asia Minor would have proved to the various races our
positive determination to uphold their rights, and to defend them from
the oppression and extortion to which they had been subjected. Such a
position would have given England the control that is absolutely
necessary to effect the reforms in the administration of Asia Minor,
without which the result will be anarchy and revolution within a few
years, fostered by Russia precisely in accordance with the policy that
has terminated in the disruption of Turkey in Europe.
In the same despatch of 30th May, 1878, Lord Salisbury continues:--
"Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte on the
occasion of the Conference at Constantinople that they
were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and
oppression, and it will be requisite before they can
enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic
territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that
they should be formally assured of the intention of the
Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the
government of the Christian and other subjects of the
Porte in those regions. IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO REQUIRE
MORE THAN AN ENGAGEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, FOR THE
SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN COULD ONLY BE DEFINED
AFTER A MORE CAREFUL INQUIRY AND DELIBERATION THAN
COULD BE SECURED AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE."
The italics are my own, for the weak point of the Convention is
exhibited by this sentence.
No "general terms" should ever be mentioned in a communication with
Orientals, and no convention should have been concluded with the Porte,
unless every detail had been previously considered and specially agreed
upon between the contracting parties. When this Convention was made
public, I concluded that the British government contemplated the
official employment of a certain number of their own officers to carry
out the spirit of the agreement, without which the Convention would be a
farce; at the same time I was convinced that the suspicions of the
Turkish government and the stubborn pride of the race would resist any
such direct interference upon the part of England. Under these
conditions Asia Minor would remain exactly where it was. A grand scheme
which would have had immense political results, had the Turks accepted
our interference in the honourable spirit of our intentions, has been
frustrated by their want of confidence, and the Convention remains,
containing an agreement of stupendous importance, by which England is
committed to a military undertaking of the first magnitude, while Turkey
risks nothing except her "PROMISES OF REFORM in the administration of
her Asiatic provinces."
"British interests" in this transaction are represented by Cyprus, which
we occupy as tenants--paying 96,000 pounds a year for the ruined house,
and leaving ourselves no balance from the revenue for the necessary
repairs.
There is no more difficult political associate than the Turk; his
defensive weapon is delay, and in moments of the greatest emergency his
peculiar apathy or patience never forsakes him. Proud and haughty to a
superlative degree, in his heart he detests all extraneous counsel and
interference, and would rather glide onward to destruction than grasp
the hand stretched out to save him. Turkey has expected much from
England, and has made a poor return for our sacrifice of blood and
treasure during the Crimean war. She obtained an ephemeral financial
reputation through the aid of France and England in becoming guarantees
for a public loan; upon this false position she traded until the
inevitable bankruptcy plunged her into ruin, and opened the gate for the
entrance of her enemies, at the same time that dishonesty entailed the
severance of friends.
