Upon the integrity of that defensive alliance against Russia,
there is no need for any station that incurs the obligations of Cyprus;
all the Turkish ports would be open to our ships. The occupation of
Cyprus would therefore suggest that a far-seeing government had doubted
the integrity of Turkey, and had therefore determined to secure a
pied-a-terre in a strategical position that would command the east of
the Mediterranean. Upon this point opinions will again differ, and I
quote the words of one of the most experienced statesmen and an
ex-minister of the Upper House, who writes:--
"The objections to Cyprus as a military and naval station are shortly
these. It will oblige us to establish a garrison, and therefore to
increase and divide our forces in the Mediterranean. There must be
barracks, hospitals, store-houses, &c. After all this expenditure Cyprus
will weaken rather than strengthen our power.
"Famagousta may be made a good harbour; but how can it be defended? The
ships will not be, as in Malta, defended by batteries projecting far
beyond the anchorage; Famagousta will require ships of war to defend it,
or batteries constructed on the breakwater--a most costly undertaking.
As a coaling-station it is not wanted, because colliers accompanying the
fleet are much more convenient. If, in short, we are supreme at sea,
Cyprus is not wanted; if we are not supreme, Cyprus will be an
incumbrance."
I acknowledge the force of a portion of the argument, and no one can
more highly respect the distinguished authority I have quoted, who, as
an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty of practical experience, must carry
the great weight of his ability and position; but I would suggest that
Famagousta is underrated. I have already described that powerful
fortress, and in its present condition, if mounted with forty-ton guns
upon the sea-face, I doubt the possibility of an attack from seaward.
The natural reefs which form the sea-wall afford the greatest facilities
for batteries a-fleur-d'eau, as their solid foundations require the
simple levelling of cement, and a facing of steel plates would complete
an impregnable line of casemates that would render the approach by sea
impossible.
The advantages of attendant colliers is great as a continuous
coal-supply to a fleet, especially during the blockade of an enemy's
port; but for a cruising fleet, or for independent vessels, the speed of
the colliers would be insufficient, and a line of coaling-stations, at
intervals of five days' steaming is in my opinion highly important, in
addition to the necessity of docks where ironclad vessels could obtain
the necessary repairs after a naval engagement. It is a serious result
of modern improvements that the cumbrous and complicated ironclads
cannot be repaired in a few days after an action with the enemy by their
own carpenters and crews, like the wooden vessels of old, but that docks
must be within reach, and all the appliances of the engineers' yards and
an arsenal.
