Without This Advantage, Famagousta Would Be A Useless
Acquisition, And Cyprus Would Be Worthless As A Strategical Position.
In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as
an ally.
England has done but little for her, and we may expect too
much. The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo-Turkish defensive
alliance, and the "Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain," are
political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us
no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined
material assistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of
their important positions--Cyprus; their only satisfaction remained in
the knowledge that they had "done us" in the bargain. We have quickly
discovered the painful fact, and one party to the alliance already feels
aggrieved, and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention.
I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friendships than an
interference in the private affairs of individuals, or in the public
administration of governments. We have assumed the enormous
responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which
we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the
abuses of her internal administration, &c. &c.! Anybody who knows Turkey
must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest
administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire, and the
promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean
war. Under these circumstances the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in a
questionable position. We have assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor
conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to
perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces, we have
a back-door for an escape from our onerous engagement. Unfortunately
English diplomacy is celebrated for back-doors. In the Berlin Treaty we
entered Cyprus through a back-door, and we may possibly retire by the
same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in
our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event
of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor.
Notwithstanding our professed sincerity, the Turk has become an
unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he
believes most thoroughly that should "British interests" require the
sacrifice of honour, England will somehow or other manage to slip
through the Ottoman fingers, and escape from her alliance when called
upon to meet Russia in the field. Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong,
and his suspicions are unfounded.
With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance, it
would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to
the practical force of Russia than to the moral rectitude and high
political principles of England. The power of Russia has been felt, and
the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered
Empire, which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the
small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of
Tchataldja.
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