Those territories; and in
order to enable England to make necessary provision for
executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the
Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus
to be occupied and administered by England.
ARTICLE II.
"The present Convention shall be ratified, and the
ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, within the
space of one month, or sooner if possible.
"In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal
of their arms.
"Done at Constantinople, the fourth day of June, in the
year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.
"A.H. LAYARD.
"SAFVET."
It was eventually agreed between the contracting Powers:-
"That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the
present excess of revenue over expenditure in the
island; this excess to be calculated and determined by
the average of the last five years."
and:--
"That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other
conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war,
the island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and
the Convention of the fourth June, 1878, will be at an
end."
I knew nothing of Cyprus, but I felt sure that the Turks had the best of
the bargain, as they would receive the usual surplus revenue from our
hands, and be saved the trouble and onus of the collection; they would
also be certain of a fixed annual sum, without any of those risks of
droughts, famine, and locusts, to which the island is exposed, and which
seriously affect the income.
Although there would only be a wildly remote chance of Russia ever
relinquishing her Asiatic prey, the bare mention of the words "will be
evacuated by England" was a possible contingency and risk, that would
effectually exclude all British capital from investment in the island. I
could not discover any possible good that could accrue to England by the
terms of the Convention. If Cyprus had been presented as a "bonus" by
the Porte to counterbalance the risk we should incur in a defensive
alliance for the protection of Asia Minor, I could have seen an addition
to our Colonial Empire of a valuable island, that would not only have
been of strategical value, but such that in a few years, money and
British settlers would have entirely changed its present aspect, and
have created for it a new era of prosperity.
If England had purchased Cyprus, I could have understood the plain,
straightforward, business-like transaction, which would have at once
established confidence, both among the inhabitants, who would have
become British subjects; and through the outer world, that would have
acknowledged the commencement of a great future.
But, if we were actually bound in defensive alliance with Turkey in case
of a war with Russia, why should we occupy Cyprus upon such one-sided
and anomalous conditions, that would frustrate all hopes of commercial
development, for the sake of obtaining a strategical position that would
have been opened to our occupation AS AN ALLY at any moment? On the
other hand, if we distrusted Turkey, and feared that she might coquet
with Russia at some future period, I could see a paramount necessity for
the occupation of Cyprus, and even Egypt; but we were supposed to be,
and I believe were, acting in absolute and mutual good faith as the
protector of Asiatic Turkey, in defensive alliance with the Sultan. In
that position, should we have entered into a war with Russia, there was
no necessity for the occupation and responsibility of any new position,
as every port of the Ottoman dominions, even to the Golden Horn of
Constantinople, would have welcomed our troops and boats with
enthusiasm.
Turkey is a suspicious Power, and the British government may have had to
contend with difficulties that are unknown to the criticising public; it
may have been impossible to have obtained her sanction for the
occupation under other conditions. The possibility of future
complications that might terminate in a close alliance between the
conquered and the victor, may have suggested the necessity for securing
this most important strategical position without delay, upon first
conditions that might subsequently receive modifications. At first sight
the political situation appeared vague, but I determined to examine the
physical geography of Cyprus, and to form my own opinion of its
capabilities.
CYPRUS AS I SAW IT IN 1879.
CHAPTER 1.
ARRIVAL AT LARNACA.
On the morning of the 4th January we sighted Cyprus at about fifty miles
distance, after a smooth voyage of twenty-six hours from Alexandria. The
day was favourable for an arrival, as the atmospherical condition
afforded both intense lights and shadows. The sky was a cobalt blue, but
upon all points of the compass local rain-clouds hovered in dark patches
near the surface, and emptied themselves in heavy showers. The air was
extremely clear, and as we steamed at ten knots each hour brought out in
prominent relief the mountain peaks of Cyprus; Olympus was capped with
clouds. Passing through a rain-cloud which for a time obscured the view,
we at length emerged into bright sunshine; the mists had cleared from
the mountain range, and Troodos, 6,400 feet above the sea-level, towered
above all competitors.
We were now about ten miles from the shore, and the general appearance
of the island suggested a recent snowfall. As the sun shone upon a bare
white surface, the sterile slopes and mountain sides were utterly devoid
of vegetation, and presented a sad aspect of desolation, which reminded
me of the barren range on the shores of the Red Sea.
First impressions are seldom correct, but the view of Cyprus on arrival
from the south was depressing, and extinguished all hopes that had been
formed concerning our newly-acquired possession.
