We Can Clearly See
That Napoleon Has Not Now The Power He Formerly Possessed And That The
Republican Party, Into Whose Hands He Has Thrown Himself, Seem Disposed Not
Only To Remain At Peace, But To Shackle Him In Every Possible Manner.
It is
evident, too, that his last success was owing to the dislike of the people
to the Bourbons
From their injudicious and treacherous conduct; and the
threats and impossible language held by the priests and emigrants towards
the holders of property paved the way for the success of his enterprise and
enabled him to achieve a triumph unparalleled in history.
On the contrary, by forcing him to go to war, should he gain the first
victory, Belgium will be re-united to France, all the resources of that
country brought into the scale against the Allies; Napoleon will be more
popular than ever, the Republican party will be put to silence, the
enthusiasm of the army will rise beyond all restraint, and, in a word,
Napoleon will be himself again. The other Allies can do little without the
assistance of England, and our finances are by no means in a state to bear
such intolerable drains.
As to the Prussians, on minute enquiry I do not find that they were so
ill-treated by the French as is generally believed, and that, except the
burden of having troops quartered on them (no small annoyance, I allow),
they had not much reason to complain. The quartering of the troops on them
and the payment of the war contributions was the necessary consequence of
the occupation of their country by an enemy; but I have just been reading a
German work, written by a native of Berlin, shortly after the entry of the
French troops in that city after the battle of Jena in 1806. This work is
entitled Vertraute Briefe aus Berlin, and in it the author distinctly
declares that the discipline observed by the French troops during the
occupation of Berlin was highly strict and praiseworthy, and that the few
excesses that took place were committed by the troops of the Rhenish
Confederation; and he adds that the inhabitants preferred having a French
soldier quartered on them to a Westphalian, Bavarian or Wuertembergher.
Further, the troops that behaved with the greatest oppression and insolence
towards the burghers were those belonging to a corps composed of native
Prussians, raised for the service of Napoleon by the Prince of
Isenburg.[12] In his recruiting address the prince invites the Prussian
youth to enter into the service of the invincible Napoleon, and tells him
that to the soldier of Napoleon everything is permitted. The regiment was
soon fitted up and the soldiers began to put in practice in good earnest
the theory of the affiche. They committed excesses of all sorts; and one
officer in particular behaved so brutally and infamously to a poor tailor
on whom he was quartered, and to whom, before he entered the French
service, he was under the greatest obligations, that General Hulin, the
commandant of the place at Berlin during the French occupation, was obliged
to cashier him publicly on the parade and to cause his epaulettes to be
torn from his coat in order to mark the disgust and indignation that he and
all the French officers felt at the base ingratitude of this man.
This work, "Vertraute Briefe" (confidential letters), contains much curious
matter and very interesting anecdotes respecting the corruption, venality
and depravation that prevailed in the Prussian Court and army previous to
the war in 1806. Let this suffice to show that the Prussians have not so
much reason to complain against the French as they pretend to have;
besides, the conduct of the Prussian Government itself was so vacillating
and contradictory that they had themselves only to blame for what they
suffered. They should have supported Austria in 1805. But the fact is that
the vanity and the amour propre of the Prussian military were so hurt at
the humiliation they experienced at and after the battle of Jena that it
was this that has embittered them so much against the French.
Let it not, however, be supposed for a moment that I seek to excuse or
palliate the conduct of Napoleon towards Prussia. I have always thought it
not only unjust but impolitic. Impolitic, because Prussia was, and ought
always to be, the obvious and natural ally of France, and Napoleon, instead
of endeavouring to crush that power, should have aggrandized her and made
her the paramount power in Germany. It was in fact his obvious policy to
cede Hanover in perpetuity to Prussia, and have rendered thereby the breach
between the Houses of Brandenburgh and Hanover irreparable and
irreconcilable. This would have thrown Prussia necessarily into the arms
of France, in whose system she must then have moved, and all British
influence on the Continent would have been effectually put an end to.
Another prime fault of Napoleon was that he did not crush and dismember
Austria in 1809 as he had it in his power to do; and by so doing he would
have merited and obtained the thanks and good will of all Germany for
having overturned so despotic and light-fearing a Government. But he has
paid dearly for these errors. Instead of destroying a despotic power
(Austria), he chose rather to crush an enlightened and liberal nation, for
such I esteem the Prussian nation, and I always separate the Prussian
people from their Government. The latter fell, and fell unpitied, after one
battle; but it has been almost miraculously restored by the unparalleled
exertions and energies of the burghers and people. May this be a lesson to
the Government! and may the King of Prussia not prove ungrateful!
Troops continue to arrive here daily, and now that the ceremony of the
Champ de Mai is over, we may expect that Napoleon will repair to his army
and commence operations.
June 17.
Napoleon arrived at Maubeuge on the 18th and the grand conflict has begun.
The Prussians were attacked on the 14th and 15th at Ligny and driven from
their position.[13] They are said to have suffered immense loss and to be
retreating with the utmost confusion.
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