This Striking Variation From The Common Fate Of Peoples Is Attributable
To Three Causes.
First, the development of a British civilisation in
Australia has synchronised with the attainment and unimpaired maintenance
of dominant sea-power by the parent nation.
The supremacy of Great
Britain upon the blue water enabled her colonies to grow to strength and
wealth under the protection of a mighty arm. Secondly, during the same
period a great change in British colonial policy was inaugurated.
Statesmen were slow to learn the lessons taught in so trenchant a fashion
by the revolt of the American colonies; but more liberal views gradually
ripened, and Lord Durham's Report on the State of Canada, issued in 1839,
occasioned a beneficent new era of self-government. The states of
Australia were soon left with no grievance which it was not within their
own power to remedy if they chose, and virtually as they chose. Thirdly,
these very powers of self-government developed in the people a signal
capacity for governing and being governed. The constitutional machinery
submitted the Executive to popular control, and made it quickly sensitive
to the public will. Authority and subjects were in sympathy, because the
subjects created the authority. Further, there was no warlike native race
in Australia, as there was in New Zealand and in South Africa, to
necessitate armed conflict. Thus security from attack, chartered
autonomy, and governing capacity, with the absence of organised
pugnacious tribes, have combined to achieve the unique result of a
continent preserved from aggression, disruption, or bloody strife for
over one hundred and twenty years.
There was a brief period, as will presently be related, when this happy
state of things was in some danger of being disturbed. It certainly would
have been impossible had not Great Britain emerged victorious from her
protracted struggle, first against revolutionary France, and later
against Napoleon, in the latter years of the eighteenth century and the
beginning of the nineteenth.
In those wars colonial possessions "became pawns in the game."* (* The
phrase is Professor Egerton's, Cambridge Modern History 9 735.) There was
no Imperialism then, with its strident note, its ebullient fervour and
flag waving. There was no national sense of pride in colonial Empire, or
general appreciation of the great potentialities of oversea possessions.
"The final outcome of the great war was the colonial ascendancy of Great
Britain, but such was not the conscious aim of those who carried through
the struggle."* (* Ibid page 736.) Diplomacy signed away with a dash of
the quill possessions which British arms had won after tough fights,
anxious blockades, and long cruises full of tension and peril. Even when
the end of the war saw the great Conqueror conquered and consigned to his
foam-fenced prison in the South Atlantic, Great Britain gave back many of
the fruits which it had cost her much, in the lives of her brave and the
sufferings of her poor, to win; and Castlereagh defended this policy in
the House of Commons on the curious ground that it was expedient "freely
to open to France the means of peaceful occupation, and that it was not
the interest of this country to make her a military and conquering,
instead of a commercial and pacific nation."* (* Parliamentary Debates 28
462.)
PART 2.
The events with which this book is mainly concerned occurred within the
four years 1800 to 1804, during which Europe saw Bonaparte leap from the
position of First Consul of the French Republic to the Imperial throne.
After great French victories at Marengo, Hochstadt, and Hohenlinden
(1800), and a brilliant naval triumph for the British at Copenhagen
(1801), came the fragile Peace of Amiens (1802) - an "experimental peace,"
as Cornwallis neatly described it. Fourteen months later (May 1803) war
broke out again; and this time there was almost incessant fighting on a
titanic scale, by land and sea, until the great Corsican was humbled and
broken at Waterloo.
The reader will be aided in forming an opinion upon the events discussed
hereafter, by a glance at the colonial situation during the period in
question. The extent of the dependencies of France and England in 1800
and the later years will be gathered from the following summary.
In America France regained Louisiana, covering the mouth of the
Mississippi. It had been in Spanish hands since 1763; but Talleyrand,
Bonaparte's foreign minister, put pressure upon Spain, and Louisiana
became French once more under the secret treaty of San Ildefonso (October
1800). The news of the retrocession, however, aroused intense feeling in
the United States, inasmuch as the establishment of a strong foreign
power at the mouth of the principal water-way in the country jeopardised
the whole trade of the Mississippi valley. President Jefferson,
recognising that the perpetuation of the new situation "would have put us
at war with France immediately," sent James Monroe to Paris to negotiate.
As Bonaparte plainly saw at the beginning of 1803 that another war with
Great Britain was inevitable, he did not wish to embroil himself with the
Americans also, and agreed to sell the possession to the Republic for
eighty million francs. Indeed, he completed arrangements for the sale
even before Monroe arrived.
Some efforts had also been made, at Bonaparte's instance, to induce Spain
to give up the Floridas, East and West, but European complications
prevented the exertion of pressure in this direction; and the whole of
Florida became part of the United States by treaty signed in 1819. The
sale of Louisiana lowered the French flag on the only remaining portion
of American territory that acknowledged the tricolour, except the
pestilential fragment of French Guiana, on the north-east of South
America, where France has had a footing since the beginning of the
seventeenth century, save for a short interval (1809 to 1815) when it was
taken by the British and Portuguese. But the possession has never been a
profitable one, and a contemporary writer, quoting an official
publication, describes it as enjoying "neither agriculture, commerce, nor
industry."* (* Fallot, L'Avenir Colonial de la France (1903) page 237.)
In the West Indies, France had lost Martinique and Guadeloupe during the
naval wars prior to Bonaparte's ascension to supreme authority.
Enter page number
PreviousNext
Page 4 of 82
Words from 3014 to 4046
of 83218
