Atlas of 1812; but admiration of
the workmanship will not commit the careful student to an equally cordial
opinion concerning the completeness and accuracy of the charts as
representations of the coasts traversed by the expedition. The south
coast - the most important part, since here the field was entirely
fresh - was very faulty in outline, and in other parts where Baudin's
vessels had opportunities for doing complete work, important features
were missed. And at the back of it all there looms the shadow of Matthew
Flinders, the merit of whose own work shines out all the brighter for the
contrast.* (* A remarkable example of the way to avoid difficult
questions by ignoring them is afforded by Girard's book on Peron, which,
throughout its 278 pages, contains no reference whatever to Flinders. It
devotes forty pages to the voyage, but absolutely suppresses all
reference to the Encounter Bay incident, the imprisonment of Flinders,
and other questions concerning him. Yet Girard's book was "couronne par
la Societe d'emulation de d'Allier." There should have been some
"rosemary, that's for remembrance," in the crown.)
CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES.
Further consideration of Napoleon's purposes.
What Australia owes to British sea power.
Influence of the Napoleonic wars.
Fresh points relative to Napoleon's designs.
Absence of evidence.
Consequences of suspicions of French intentions.
Promotion of settlement in Tasmania.
Tardy occupation of Port Phillip.
The Swan River Settlement.
The Westernport scheme.
Lord John Russell's claim of "the Whole" of Australia for the British.
The designs of Napoleon III.
Australia the nursling of sea power.
The question of paramount interest connected with the events considered
in the foregoing pages is whether or not the expedition of 1800 to 1804
had a political purpose. It is hoped that the examination to which the
facts have been subjected has been sufficient to show that it had not. It
was promoted by an academic organisation of learned men for scientific
objects; it was not an isolated effort, but one of a series made by the
French, which had their counterpart in several expeditions despatched by
the British, for the collection of data and the solution of problems of
importance to science; its equipment and personnel showed it to be what
it professed to be; and the work it did, open to serious criticism as it
is in several aspects, indicated that purposes within the scope of the
Institute of France, and not those with which diplomacy and politics were
concerned, were kept in view throughout. So much, it is claimed, has been
demonstrated. But the whole case is not exhausted in what has been
written; and in this final chapter will be briefly set forth a sequence
of reasons which go to show that Bonaparte in 1800 had no thought of
founding a new fatherland for the French in Australasia, or of
establishing upon the great southern continent a rival settlement to that
of the British at Port Jackson.
It may legitimately be suggested that though all the French expeditions
enumerated in a previous chapter, including Baudin's, were promoted for
purposes of discovery, the rulers of France were not without hope that
profit would spring from them in the shape of rich territories or fields
for French exploitation. It is, indeed, extremely likely that such was
the case. Governments, being political organisations, are swayed chiefly
by political considerations, or at any rate are largely affected by them.
When Prince Henry the Navigator fitted out the caravels that crept
timidly down the west coast of Africa, penetrating farther and farther
into the unknown, until a new ocean and new realms at length opened upon
the view he was inspired by the ideal of spreading the Christian religion
and of gaining knowledge about the shape of the world for its own sake;
but he was none the less desirous of securing augmented wealth and
dominion for Portugal.* (* See Beazley, Henry the Navigator pages 139 to
141; and E.J. Payne, in Cambridge Modern History 1 10 to 15.) It was not
solely for faith and science that he:
"Heaven inspired,
To love of useful glory roused mankind
And in unbounded commerce mixed the world."
Isabella of Castile did not finance Columbus purely for the glory of
discovery. Luis de Santangel and Alonso de Quintanilla, who prevailed
upon her to befriend the daring Genoese, not only used the argument that
the voyage would present an opportunity of "spreading her holy religion,"
but also that it would "replenish her treasury chests."* (* Justin
Winsor, Christopher Columbus page 178.) It is as natural for the
statesman to hope for political advantage as for the man of science to
look for scientific rewards, the geographer for geographical results, the
merchant for extended scope for commerce, from any enterprise of the kind
in which the State concerns itself. It would have been a perfectly proper
aspiration on the part of French statesmen to seek for opportunities of
development in a region as yet scarcely touched by European energy. But
there is no more reason for attributing this motive to Bonaparte in 1800,
than to the Ministers of Louis XV and Louis XVI, or to the Government of
France during the Revolution: and that is the point.
It is to misinterpret the character of the Napoleon Bonaparte who ruled
the Republic in the early period of the Consulate, to suppose him
incapable of wishing to promote research for its own sake. He desired the
glory of his era to depend upon other achievements than those of war. "My
intention certainly is," he said to Thibaudeau, "to multiply the works of
peace. It may be that in the future I shall be better known by them than
by my victories." The Memoires of the shrewd observer to whom the words
were uttered, give us perhaps a more intimate acquaintance with the
Consular Bonaparte than does any other single book; and it is impossible
to study them without deriving the impression that he was at this time
far more than a great soldier.
